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I. Executive Summary
Crude oil and natural gas production in the U.S. has dramatically
increased with the recent technological advances in drilling and completion
techniques. This production is processed, transported, distributed, and sold
via an extensive North American pipeline network.
Roughly two-thirds of U.S. energy demand is transported by pipeline.
Due to a number of factors discussed in this paper this delivery system is
quite vulnerable. Under the current regulatory structure there are few
mandated standards regarding pipeline cybersecurity. Regulators rely on
voluntary standards adopted by state and federal agencies, developed with
industry assistance.
Despite being more important to national commerce than ever, numerous
existing pipeline systems are quite dated. Many utilize outdated technology
and were constructed utilizing techniques and materials prone to excessive
rates of failure due to latent construction and material defects.
Statistical analysis indicates pipelines more than forty years old are much
more likely to rupture or leak under standard operating conditions.
Meanwhile, most pipeline systems have become more automated and, in
theory, have also become increasingly more vulnerable to data breaches and
cyber intrusions. While there have been no major incidents involving a
domestic cyberattack on the pipeline infrastructure, the risks are increasing
exponentially. A major cyberattack on energy infrastructure would not be
unexpected under the current regime and, if carried out, would result in a
potentially devastating circumstance.
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In this analysis, we examine the current state of the pipeline
infrastructure in the U.S., the potential physical and cyber threats to such
systems, the issue of whether voluntary cybersecurity standards are
sufficient to protect the public from harm, as well as potential tort liability
for cyber intrusions and the associated legal issues.
II. Introduction
Cybersecurity issues have become a major concern of many domestic
consumer, financial, industrial, and retail organizations. 1 With the general
public devoting most of its attention to the cyber intrusions within these
organizations, few realize that the energy sector—including pipelines,
power plants, refineries, transmission grids, and even individual wells—are
potentially a major target for cyberattacks or intrusion. 2 According to the
Department of Homeland Security the energy sector has incurred more
cybersecurity incidents than any other sector over the past several years. 3
A November 2015 survey issued by security vendor Tripwire indicated
that 82% of oil and gas industry respondents reported their organizations
experienced an increase in cyberattacks over the previous 12 months.4
Additionally, 53% of respondents stated that the rate of cyberattacks had
increased between 50% and 100% during that same period.5 The survey
noted further that almost seven out of ten respondents indicated a lack of
confidence in their organizations to detect and stop attacks.
Potentially, these intrusions could result in millions of dollars in
economic damages or drastic harm to the environment, all while putting the
welfare and safety of U.S. citizens at risk. With the possibility of
cyberattacks looming, the oil and gas industry has become aware of the

1. See Noah G. Susskind, Note, Cybersecurity Compliance and Risk Management
Strategies: What Directors, Officer, and Managers Need to Know, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus.
573 (2015).
2. See Michael L. Krancer et al., Energy Sector Beware: Cybersecurity Now Top
Security Threat, The Legal Intelligencer, Oct. 16, 2015, http://www.thelegal
intelligencer.com/id=1202739941630/Energy-Sector-Beware-Cybersecurity-Now-TopSecurity-Threat?mcode=0&curindex=0&curpage=ALL.
3. Id.
4. In the Pipeline, Insurance Business, Aug. 18, 2016, http://www.ibamag.com/
news/cyber/in-the-pipeline-36549.aspx.
5. Id.; See, e.g., Cyber Attacks Hit Oil, Gas, Just as Much as Retail,Greeley Tribune,
Apr. 1, 2014, where it was noted the Director of the National Security Agency and head of
the U.S. Cyber Command stated that energy companies were targeted in 41% of the
malicious software attack cases reported to the Department of Homeland Security in 2012.
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growing threat and its vulnerability. In a 2015 survey, Ernst & Young
reported that “61% of oil and gas organizations surveyed believed they
would be unlikely to be able to detect and react to a sophisticated
cyberattack.” 6
A recent Wall Street Journal survey of information technology
executives in both the U.S. and in Europe found that 48% believed it is
“likely there will be a cyberattack on critical infrastructure in the next three
years that will result in the loss of life.” 7 These surveys also note the cost of
cybersecurity threats, with the assets required to address these threats
increasing at an alarming rate.
This cybersecurity threat extends across the energy sector, from oil and
natural gas wells, pipelines, processing plants, refineries, gas utilities, to
hydrocarbon retailers. 8 In this analysis we will focus on the state of the
nation’s liquid and natural gas pipeline system, its vulnerability to
cyberattacks, and the potential liability of pipeline operators.
Cybersecurity threats to pipeline operations are increasing in importance
as the volume of crude oil and natural gas production in North American is
increasing and, after production, these substances are being shipped further
distances to market. 9
Advances in drilling and hydraulic fracturing technology have increased
crude oil production in the U.S. by roughly 72% and natural gas by 30%
from 2010 to 2015, according to U.S. Energy Information Administration
data. 10 Numerous new pipelines are being built or expanded to handle the

6. Jon Mainwaring, Five Jobs Set to Grow in Oil, Gas: Cybersecurity, Rigzone (May
3, 2016), http://www.rigzone.com/news/oil_gas/a/144291/five_jobs_set_to_grow_in_oil_
gas_cybersecurity (citing PwC Inc. survey findings that security incidents detected by oil
and gas firms increased by 93% in the previous year.).
7. Ben Dipietro, Survey Roundup: Deadly Cyberattack Worries, Wall St. J. (Jul. 24,
2015), http://on.wsj.com/1CVsrWK (notably “critical infrastructures” included but was not
limited to pipelines after surveying 625 IT professionals).
8. See, e.g., Elisabeth R. Myers, Oil Pipelines, 2010 A.B.A. Recent Dev. Pub. Util.
Comm. & Transp. 16 (2010), available at http://www.huschblackwell.com/~/media/files/
businessinsights/businessinsights/2010/07/oil%20pipelines%202010%20edition%20of%20e
mrecent%20developme__/files/100720_oilpipelines/fileattachment/100720_oilpipelines.pdf.
9. See Pierre Bertrand, Ensuring Pipeline Physical and Cyber Security, Plant
Engineering (May 20, 2015), http://www.plantengineering.com/single-article/ensuringpipeline-physical-and-cyber-security/a0f2373b0adc20ac7cc40aef5a52b2a8.html.
10. See U.S. Energy Information Administration, Petroleum & Other Liquids, database
at https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_crd_crpdn_adc_mbblpd_a.htm; see also U.S. Energy
Information
Administration,
U.S.
Dry
Gas
Production,
database
at
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9070us2M.htm.
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additional volumes of hydrocarbon volumes being transported across North
America. 11
It is estimated that the U.S. currently has 182,000 miles of hazardous
liquid pipelines, 12 325,000 miles of natural gas transmission pipelines, and
2.15 million miles of natural gas distribution pipelines along with the
associated metering, pumping, sensors, and valves that accompany each. 13
Over 3,000 private and public companies own and operate the nation’s
pipelines according to recent estimates.14 Due to the ubiquitous nature of
the energy delivery system a cyberattack on such energy infrastructure
presents the risk of “unfathomable asymmetrical physical damage” to life
and property according to some experts. 15
Those who study cybersecurity issues realize that it is potential
cyberattacks on the energy space, not the consumer credit space, that could
cripple the United States economy. 16 At the extreme end of the spectrum a
large cyberattack on energy infrastructure could bring about a collapse of
society that most of us associate with apocalyptical scenarios.
The costs of such a pipeline system cybersecurity breach include the cost
of business interruption, damage to third parties, and damage to the
physical plant or equipment and control systems. For those companies that
are publicly traded, the cost could include a large post-breach drop in the
11. Sabine Hoover, Energy Outlook: Key Trends Impacting the Construction Industry,
Construction Executive (Jan. 15, 2015), http://enewsletters.constructionexec.com/
managingyourbusiness/2015/01/energy-outlook-key-trends-impacting-the-constructionindustry/; see also P&GJ’s 2017 Worldwide Pipeline Construction Report, Pipeline & Gas
Journal. (Jan. 2017), https://pgjonline.com/2017/01/03/pgjs-2017-worldwide-pipelineconstruction-report/ (noting that North America leads the world in pipeline construction with
31,814 miles of new or planned lines for oil and natural gas).
12. Hazardous liquids pipelines include pipelines transporting crude oil, natural gas
liquids, gasoline, and other petroleum hydrocarbons.
13. See Belle Hillenburg, Nation’s Pipeline Increasingly at Risk of Cyber, Physical
Attacks, HOMELAND SECURITY TODAY, (May 9, 2016, 6:00 AM), http://www.hstoday.us/singlearticle/nation-s-pipelines-increasingly-at-risk-of-cyber-physical-attacks/e55550d405dcb 5ba3f1
e9ca1cabc7757.html.
14. Pipelines: Securing the Veins of the American Economy: Hearing Before the H.
Subcomm. on Transp. Sec., 114th Cong. 1 (2016) (statement of Sonya Proctor, Surface
Division Director, Office of Security Policy and Industry Engagement), available at
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM07/20160419/104773/HHRG-114-HM07-WstateProctorS-20160419.pdf.
15. Krancer et al., supra note 2.
16. See, e.g., Michael Krancer, The Biggest Cybersecurity Threat: The Energy Sector,
Forbes (Nov. 4, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelkrancer/2015/11/04/thebiggest-cybersecurity-threat-the-energy-sector/#6fbe128 736ba.
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stock value. 17 For example, past post-breach market reaction has led to
declines in shareholder values ranging from 17% to over 30% as well as
creating business and market disruptions that can last for weeks. 18 Due to
the limited extent of disclosures required for a cybersecurity breach,
damages are difficult to estimate. Some analysts, however, claim oil and
gas companies lose $8.4 million per day due to cyberattacks. 19
Both applicable regulations and tort laws are evolving as cyber intrusions
become more commonplace. In many cases, the industry along with federal
and state regulators face issues and fact scenarios regarding cyber intrusions
that have never been addressed – an exciting frontier in the energy sector
where courts and regulatory agencies have already meticulously addressed
most other exploration issues.
III. SCADA Data Systems
As with many industries, the energy sector has become more and more
reliant on computerized control and data systems. Among the more
commonly utilized operational control systems employed in the energy
sector are the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (“SCADA”)
systems. 20
SCADA systems are software-based control systems that can monitor
and control multiple aspects of operations for a variety of industrial and
utility sectors including railways, utility power grids, water and sewer
systems, and pipeline networks. 21
SCADA systems can collect real-time data such as line pressure from
sensors located throughout the pipeline network. This data can be
monitored by operators from a remote control room, often many miles away
from the physical operations. 22 SCADA systems provide the operator with

17. See Susskind, supra note 1, at 575.
18. Id.
19. Hillary Hellmann, Comment, Acknowledging the Threat: Securing United States
Pipeline SCADA Systems, 36 Energy L.J. 157, 158 (2015) (citing Stewart Baker et al., In the
Dark: Critical Industries Confront Cyberattacks, McAfee (2011)).
20. See, e.g., Hellmann, supra note 19; see also CAE, Inc. v. Clean Air Eng’n Inc., No.
97 C 3264, 2000 WL 28274, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 2000), aff’d, 267 F.3d 660 (7th Cir.
2001).
21. See, e.g., PAUL W. PARFOMAK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42660, PIPELINE
CYBERSECURITY: FEDERAL POLICY 3 (2012), http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB424/docs/Cyber-076.pdf; see also Clean Air Eng’n, 2000 WL 28274, at *3-4 (Jan.
10, 2000).
22. See PARFOMAK, supra note 21, at 3; see also Hellmann, supra note 19, at 159.
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feedback and information about the entire pipeline system and triggers
safety alarms when operating conditions are not within the prescribed
design parameters. 23 For example SCADA systems monitor pressures,
temperatures, tank levels, pump speeds among other variables.
As the court noted in Clean Air Engineering, SCADA systems can
“reduce operating costs by optimizing system efficiency and maximizing
resource utilization. These features enable companies to study and evaluate
their processes and to improve efficiency and safety in critical situations.” 24
Operators can send commands from their SCADA workstations to
control the pipeline infrastructure, which includes valves, pumps, and
compressor stations. 25 While this technology is integral to the functionality
of modern day pipeline systems, SCADA systems have become
increasingly vulnerable to outside invasion and manipulation. 26
The Congressional Research Service recently released a summary on
pipeline security, concluding the domestic network is “increasingly
vulnerable” to cyberattacks. 27 Specifically, the report notes that “cyber
infiltration of [SCADA] systems could allow successful ‘hackers’ to disrupt
pipeline services and cause spills, explosions, or fires—all from remote
locations via the Internet or other communication pathways.” 28
SCADA-related problems were identified to be part of, if not the
proximate cause of recent pipeline accidents, some of which resulted in
extreme consequences. 29 For example, in what has been commonly known
as the “San Bruno pipeline explosion,” a 30-inch diameter natural gas
transmission pipeline owned and operated by PG&E ruptured and caught

23. Trudy E. Bell, Pipeline Safety & Security: Is It No More Than a Pipe Dream?, The
Bent, at 13, 15 (2015), http://www.tbp.org/pubs/Features/W15Bell.pdf (identifying that it is
not uncommon for operators to not respond to alarms o the SCADA systems due to the
number of false alarms).
24. Clean Air Engin’n, 2000 WL 28274, at * 3 (Jan. 10, 2000).
25. See id. at 3-4; see also: Hellmann, supra note 19, at 159-60.
26. See Hellman, supra 19, at 160-65.; see also Pipelines: Securing the Veins of the
American Economy: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Transp. Sec., 114th Cong. 4
(2016) [hereinafter Parfomak Testimony] (statement of Paul W. Parfomak, Specialist in
Energy
and
Infrastructure
Policy),
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM07/
20160419/104773/HHRG-114-HM07-Bio-ParfomakP-20160419.pdf
(“The
increased
vulnerability of pipeline SCADA systems due to their modernization, taken together with the
emergence of SCADA-specific malicious software and the recent cyber attacks, suggests
that cybersecurity threats to pipelines have been increasing.”).
27. See PARFOMAK, supra note 21, at 9.
28. Id. at 1.
29. Id. at 4.
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fire in San Bruno, California due to “erroneous and unavailable SCADA
pressure readings.” 30 Gas escaping from the rupture ignited, resulting in the
loss of 8 lives, injuries to 58 people, destruction of 38 homes, moderate to
severe damage to 17 homes, and minor damage to 53 homes. 31 Further
illustrative, in June 1999, an oil pipeline in Bellingham, Washington,
ruptured due to the faulty use of the SCADA system, spilling 237,000
gallons of gasoline into a creek. The gasoline ignited, killing three, injuring
eight, and causing $45 million in damage. 32 Others have noted that a 2005
refinery explosion in Texas City, Texas, resulting in the death of 15 people
and the injury of 170 others, was due in part to faulty SCADA signals. 33
In the extensive investigation following the San Bruno pipeline
explosion, California regulators found “deficiencies in PG&E's SCADA
system” – despite the fact that it was one of the largest and most
sophisticated in the nation – in addition to inadequate controls in place at
the district center responsible for emergency response. 34 While the
incidents were accidental, they demonstrate the damage that can occur from
a pipeline system being breached by a third-party’s cyberattack.
A recent report from the Congressional Research Service concluded that
the modernization of SCADA systems, the emergence of SCADA-specific
malicious software, and recent attempted cyberattacks point to the
conclusion that cybersecurity threats to domestic pipelines are increasing to
what some might describe as an alarming level. 35

30. See id. at 4; see also Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utilities Comm’n, 237 Cal. App.
4th 812, 823 (2015) (noting the Commission's consumer protection and safety division
concluded that there were deficiencies in pipeline construction and a failure to follow
industry practices among other problems.).
31. Id. at 821.
32. See PARFOMAK, supra note 21, at 4; see also JOSEPH WEISS, PROTECTING
INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS FROM ELECTRONIC THREATS 123-28 (2010).
33. See SCADA Systems and the Terrorist Threat: Protecting the Nation's Critical
Control Systems: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Economic Security, Infrastructure
Protection,
and
Cybersecurity,
109th
Cong.
84
(2005),
available
at
https://fas.org/irp/congress/2005hr/scada.pdf (“This accident did not involve a cyber attack,
but the accident evolved as a result of the misinterpretation of signals and indicators, which
could be affected by a cyber attack.”).
34. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 237 Cal. App. 4th at 823 (PG&E's SCADA system was
called “one of the largest in the U.S., providing remote control of 6,438 miles of
transmission pipeline” (Id. at note 4) (emphasis added)).
35. PAUL W. PARFOMAK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41536, KEEPING AMERICA'S
PIPELINES SAFE AND SECURE: KEY ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 5 (2013),
https://www.aga.org/sites/default/files/pipeline_security_crs_march_2012.pdf.
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Cyber intrusions into SCADA control systems for oil and gas wells and
gathering systems have already caused potential environmental as well as
physical equipment damage. For example, in Vaquero Energy, Inc. v.
Herda 36 an operator of oil and gas wells, treating equipment, and pipeline
gathering systems in Texas, Colorado, California, and Wyoming hired a
third-party vendor to maintain and upgrade their SCADA control system’s
software and hardware.
The third-party vendor altered the SCADA software in such a manner the
operator could not access the computer system to monitor and control the
wells, gathering lines, treating, storage and pipeline equipment.37 As a
result, an oil treater overheated and was damaged. In addition, overflow and
process alarms had been disabled.38 This lack of operating alarms put the
employees at danger and potentially could have caused the oil, gas, and
saline produced water to have been released, harming both the environment
and third parties in the immediate vicinity. 39
The natural gas in Vaquero Energy contained hydrogen sulfide,
otherwise known as “sour gas,” which can be deadly to humans and
animals if inhaled even in small quantities. The court issued an injunction
preventing the third-party contractor from keeping the operator from
accessing the SCADA control system, noting “environmental injury, by its
nature, can seldom be adequately remedied by money damages and is often
permanent or at least of long duration, i.e., irreparable.” 40
A. Infrastructure Cyberattacks
While physical attacks on pipelines have been more common,
cyberattacks on pipeline systems are becoming more frequent as systems
are computerized. For example, in June 1982, a major explosion occurred
on the Trans-Siberian gas pipeline. The pipeline’s control software
unknowingly contained malicious code that massively increased the
pipeline pressure, eventually leading to the explosion.41

36. No. 1:15-CV-0967-JLT, 2015 WL 5173535 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2015).
37. Id. at *12.
38. Id. at *6, 9.
39. Id. at *8 (An employee of the operator claimed the intrusion could cause “a H2S gas
release, high pressure steam release, fire, oil spill, or pipeline rupture.”).
40. Id. at *13 (quoting Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 545,
(1987)).
41. See Eric. J. Byres, Cyber Security and the Pipeline Control System, Pipeline & Gas
Journal, Feb. 2009, available at https://pgjonline.com/2009/03/20/cyber-security-and-thepipeline-control-system/.
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One account of the incident noted “the pipeline software that was to run
the pumps, turbines, and values was programmed to go haywire, after a
decent interval, to reset pumps speed and value settings to produce
pressures far beyond those acceptable for pipeline joints and welds.” 42 The
resulting three-kiloton explosion was the equivalent of a nuclear weapon,
one of the largest non-nuclear explosions in history, disrupting gas supplies
and Russian exports for over a year. 43
In the winter of 2002-2003, hackers possibly affiliated with an oil
industry strike penetrated a SCADA system of Petroleos de Venezuela,
S.A. that was responsible for crude oil tanker loading for international
export. The hackers erased programmable logic controllers in storage and
pipeline systems which delayed crude oil loading. 44
More recently, the 1,099-mile-long Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (“BTC”)
pipeline was outfitted with both sensors and cameras to monitor every inch
of the line from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean Sea. Traversing
strategic, politically unsettled terrain, the forty-inch diameter line was built
to be one of the most secure in the world. 45 But when the pipeline exploded
in 2008, it was a mystery why no alarm systems were triggered and why
monitoring cameras failed to pick up any unusual activity. Over 30,000
barrels of oil spilled after the pipeline exploded and caught fire. 46
Only years later did authorities discover the BTC pipeline explosion was,
in fact, the result of a sophisticated cyberattack on the pipeline’s control
system. 47 The hackers entry point into the control system was, ironically,
through the pipeline’s surveillance camera system. 48 The incident cost more

42. Id. (quoting THOMAS REED, AT THE ABYSS: AN INSIDER’S VIEW OF THE COLD WAR
269 (Presidio Press 2005)).
43. See Alec Russell, CIA plot led to huge blast in Siberian gas pipeline, The Telegraph
(Feb. 28, 2004), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/1455559/
CIA-plot-led-to-huge-blast-in-Siberian-gas-pipeline.html; see also William Safire, The
Farewell Dossier, N.Y. Times (Feb 2, 2004) (U.S. intelligence agencies initially thought that
the blast could have been a small nuclear device detonated by the Russians, raising security
concerns.).
44. See Byres, supra note 41.
45. See Jordan Robertson & Michael Riley, Mysterious ’08 Turkey Pipeline Blast
Opened New Cyberwar, Bloomberg (Dec. 10, 2014), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2014-12-10/mysterious-08-turkey-pipeline-blast-opened-new-cyberwar;
see
also Parfomak Testimony, supra note 26, at 2.
46. See Robertson & Riley, supra note 45.
47. Id.
48. See id.; see also Graham Speake, Cybersecurity 2015: Connected Pipelines and
Proliferation of Threats to Infrastructure, Pipeline & Gas Journal (May 2015),
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than $5 million per day in lost transport tariffs and the State Oil Fund of the
Republic of Azerbaijan lost nearly $1 billion in export revenue.49
Domestically, in 2012, the Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency
Response Team (“ICSCERT”) within the Department of Homeland
Security (“DHS”) became aware of a identified a continual series of
attempted cyberattacks against U.S. natural gas pipeline operators that had
begun in December 2011. 50 ICSCERT reported that various pipeline
companies experienced targeted “spear-phishing” attempts and invasions
into many natural gas pipeline organizations, all possibly related to a single
campaign to disrupt pipeline operations. 51
B. Physical Attacks
Physical attacks on pipelines and pipeline systems using explosives or
other means have exposed the potential vulnerability and damage that could
occur should they rupture or otherwise fail.52 As the following examples
illustrate, pipeline systems have long been the target of numerous plots
intended to cause significant damage. In 2005, a U.S. citizen sought to
conspire with Al Qaeda to attack a major natural gas pipeline in the eastern
region of the United States. 53 In 2006, federal authorities discovered a
posting on a website purportedly linked to Al Qaeda that encouraged
attacks on U.S. pipelines using weapons or hidden explosives. 54
In 2007, the U.S. Department of Justice arrested members of a terrorist
group planning to attack jet fuel pipelines and storage tanks at the John F.
Kennedy International Airport.55 In 2011, an individual planted a bomb,
which did not detonate, along a natural gas pipeline in Oklahoma. 56 In

https://pgjonline.com/2015/05/12/cybersecurity-2015-connected-pipelines-and-proliferationof-threats-to-infrastructure/.
49. See Hellmann, supra note 19, at 165.
50. Id. at 164.
51. Id.
52. See Parfomak Testimony, supra note 26, at 1-2.
53. See William Vitka, Penn. Man Named in Alleged Terror Plot, CBS News (Feb. 11,
2006), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/penn-man-named-in-alleged-terror-plot/.
54. Id.
55. Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Four Individuals Charged in Plot to Bomb
John F. Kennedy International Airport (June 2, 2007), https://www.justice.gov/
archive/usao/nye/pr/2007/2007jun02.html.
56. Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office, Konawa Man Sentenced for Attempting to
Destroy
or
Damage
Property
Using
an
Explosive
(Dec.
5,
2012),
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2012, a man who reportedly had been corresponding with “Unabomber”
Ted Kaczynski unsuccessfully attempted to bomb a natural gas pipeline in
Plano, Texas. 57
Canadian pipelines have also been targeted by physical attacks. Natural
gas pipelines in British Columbia, Canada, were bombed six times between
October 2008 and July 2009 by unknown perpetrators in acts classified by
authorities as environmentally motivated “domestic terrorism.” 58 These
bombings were extremely dangerous because some of the natural gas
contained deadly concentrations of hydrogen sulfide.59
To date, no bombings of U.S. pipelines have succeeded, but the threat of
a physical attack remains credible.60 A cyber-attack on a pipeline control
system might have a similar effect as a well-placed bomb.
IV. Pipeline Integrity Issues
In addition to concerns about malicious physical damage or damage from
cyber intrusions, spills due to pipeline defects, construction activity, and
corrosion also present concurrent safety issues. 61 For example, the sixtyfive-year-old Pegasus Pipeline recently ruptured in a subdivision of
Mayflower, Arkansas, resulting in a major crude oil spill which
contaminated the neighborhood and adjoining waterways. 62 The Pegasus
transmission line failure was blamed on latent welding defects. 63
https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/oklahomacity/press-releases/2012/konawa-man-sentencedfor-attempting-to-destroy-or-damage-property-using-an-explosive.
57. See Valerie Wigglesworth, Plano Blast Suspect Corresponded with Unabomber,
Dall.
Morning
News
(June
29,
2014),
http://www.dallasnews.com/news/
plano/2014/06/29/plano-blast-suspect-corresponded-with-unabomber; see also Press
Release, U.S. Attorney's Office, Plano Man Guilty in Pipeline Bombing Incident (June 3,
2013), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edtx/pr/plano-man-guilty-pipeline-bombing-incident.
58. See Parfomak Testimony, supra note 26, at 2.
59. Hydrogen sulfide contaminated gas is referred to as “sour gas” in the industry.
Special contingency plans must be prepared by producers in the event the deadly gas should
leak from the production stream putting the public at risk.
60. See Parfomak Testimony, supra note 26, at 2.
61. See, e.g., Daniel Gilbert, Big Spills from Aging Oil Pipelines, Wall St. J. (Apr. 15,
2013), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323741004578418693982405224.
62. See Allison Sider, Exxon Faces Fine in Spill, Wall St. J. (Nov. 6, 2013),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304448204579182331170785944 (noting
5,000 barrels of oil leaked from the May 29, 2013 rupture).
63. See U.S. DEP’T. OF TRANSP., PIPELINES AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY
ADMIN., FAILURE INVESTIGATION REPORT – MOBILE PIPELINE PEGASUS RUPTURE 2 (2013),
http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/staticfiles/PHMSA/DownloadableFiles/Files/FIR_redacts_marke
d_2016_06_16_Redacts_applied.pdf.
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The Department of Transportation’s (“DOT”) Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration (“PHMSA”) regulates and enforces the
safety standards involved in pipeline construction and operation. PHMSA
accordingly documents numerous pipeline spills and leaks that occur every
year due to welding failures, corrosion, excavation damage, incorrect
operation, or natural events.
In a 30-month study of pipeline incidents ending in July 2012, PHMSA
found 1,337 “unintentional releases” of crude oil, hazardous liquid
hydrocarbons, or natural gas – more than one per day – across the nation. 64
The large number of spills and leaks adds to concerns about the integrity of
the nation’s pipeline system and its susceptibility to cyberattack.
A prominent release identified in the PHMSA study was the single
largest onshore oil pipeline spill in U.S. history. 65 On July 25, 2010,
Enbridge’s 40-year-old, 30-inch pipeline ruptured near Marshall, Michigan,
discharging more than 20,000 barrels of crude into suburban Talmadge
Creek, ultimately fouling 40 miles of the Kalamazoo River, a tributary to
Lake Michigan. 66 The cause was later identified as having occurred due to
corrosion fatigue and defective welding. 67
Analyzing pipeline failures during the period subject to the study
PHMSA found that faulty materials, faulty construction, and outdated
welding techniques were some of the most common causes. 68 Pipelines
built in the pre-1970’s era utilizing outdated technology still account for
between a quarter to a third of the mileage of hazardous liquid pipelines in

64. See DAVID SHAW ET AL., PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIAL SAFETY
ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. FINAL REPORT NO. 12-173, LEAK DETECTION
STUDY 2-5 (2012), available at http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/staticfiles/PHMSA/
DownloadableFiles/Files/Press%20Release%20Files/Leak%20Detection%20Study.pdf (The
study was conducted with pipeline engineering consultants Kiefner & Associates, Inc.).
65. See id. at 3-65-66; see also Bell, supra note 23, at 14.
66. See Bell, supra note 23, at 14.
67. See id. at 13; see also Tom Fowler & Daniel Gilbert, Oil-Pipeline Cracks Evading
Robotic Smart Pigs, Wall St. J. (Aug. 16, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001
424127887323455104579015140328479048.
68. See Gilbert, supra note 61; see also ); see also Mike Lee, Decades of Ruptures from
Defect Shows Perils of Old Pipe, Bloomberg (Sept, 2, 2013) (noting that “faulty welds and
materials accounted for 36 percent of spills and leaks on liquids pipelines between 2006 and
2010, more than any other cause, according to a Transportation Department report.”).
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service. 69 Replacing the low frequency electronic resistance welded pipe
would cost as much as $1 million per mile, or more than $50 billion.70
A. Electronic Leak Detection Systems
As pipeline systems have become more automated and sophisticated, one
would expect electronic leak detection systems to be very efficient at
promptly identifying leaks, ruptures, spills, or abnormal operating
conditions. In practice this has not been the case, as leak detection
equipment tends to issue “false positives”: warnings of a leak or spill when
none has occurred. 71
Studies conducted by industry regulators analyzing false alarms found
that sensitivity level of monitoring equipment is typically adjusted upward
to reduce the number of false signals; a lower sensitivity setting will
produce more false alarms. 72 Because of this, some legitimate alarms may
be discounted by the operator. In addition, the monitoring equipment may
sometimes be disconnected entirely due to a high number of false alarm
issuances, rendering the equipment useless in emergency leak detection.73
For example, in September 2016, the Colonial Pipeline, which delives
product from the Gulf Coast to the Northeast United States, ruptured and
spilled 8,000 barrels of gasoline.74 The leak was inadvertently discovered
by a state mine inspector days after the rupture. The automated control
system gave no warnings of the potentially deadly spill.75
Despite the best efforts of pipeline operators and equipment
manufacturers and a rapid increase in technological advancement, federal
69. See Lee, supra note 68.
70. Id. (citing an estimate by Brigham McCown, a Dallas consultant who served as
Administrator of the PHMSA in 2005 and 2006.).
71. Interview with Lynn Helms, Director, North Dakota Oil & Gas Commission, in
Denver Colo. (May 2016).
72. See PIPELINES AND HAZARDOUS MATERIAL SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, U.S DEP’T OF
TRANSP., LEAK DETECTION TECHNOLOGY STUDY 8 (2007), available at
http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/staticfiles/PHMSA/DownloadableFiles/S10-080623-002Signed.pdf; see also Shaw, supra note 65, at 4-28.
73. Interview with Lynn Helms, supra note 72 (Mr. Helms indicated that the design or
operation of alarm systems has been a major engineering and operational challenge for
pipeline operators in the State of North Dakota as well as elsewhere, and many of the
problems seen in alarm systems remain unsolved from an engineering or technology
standpoint.); see Shaw, supra note 65, at 4-9.
74. Alison Sider, Federal Regulators Investigate Colonial Pipeline Leak, Wall St. J.
(Sept. 16, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/federal-regulators-investigate-colonialpipeline-leak-1474072198?mod=pls_whats_news_us_business_f.
75. Id.
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agency records suggest pipeline-monitoring technology designed to detect
leaks is nearly as successful as a random member of the public discovering
the rupture. 76 During the 20 months prior to the most recent rupture, the
Colonial Pipeline had 8 pipeline spills across its 5,500-mile fuel pipeline
system. According to federal data, every one of these spills went undetected
by the company's primary leak-detection system. 77
The issue of faulty leak detection systems stretches well beyond the
Colonial Pipeline. According to a Reuters review of PHMSA data, since
2010, there have been at least 466 incidents in which a pipeline carrying
crude oil or refined products has leaked. Of those, only 105, or 22%, were
identified by an advanced detection system. 78
A recent study of North Dakota pipelines found similar shortfalls on
electronic leak detection systems. 79 The study was instigated by state
regulators after a crude oil pipeline leaked for 11 days continually before
being discovered by a farmer plowing his field, spilling 20,600 barrels of
oil, one of the largest spills in the history of the state. 80 This incident was
one of several prior leaks along the same pipeline where leak detection
systems failed to give the operator notice of an operational problem. 81
The study found that members of the public were more likely to discover
a leak than an electronic warning system, leading to the conclusions that the
effectiveness of leak detection technologies is marginal, except in detecting
the largest of releases.82 The report summarizes:
Most pipeline leaks are discovered visually by people who
happen to be in the area of the spill. Sensor and software

76. See Jarret Renshaw & Devika Krishna Kumar, Technology designed to detect U.S.
energy pipeline leaks often fails, Reuters (Sept. 30, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/ususa-pipelines-colonial-analysis-idUSKCN1200FQ.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See ENERGY & ENVTL. RESEARCH CTR., UNIV. OF N.D., LIQUIDS GATHERING
PIPELINES: A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS (2015).
80. Nick Smith, Oil Leak Questions Taken up at Energy Meeting, Bismarck Tribune
(Oct. 14, 2013), http://bismarcktribune.com/bakken/oil-leak-questions-taken-up-at-energymeeting/article_159142ee-351d-11e3-bd23-0019bb2963f4.html.
81. Interview with Lynn Helms, supra note 72.
82. See ENERGY & ENVTL. RESEARCH CTR., supra note 80, at xvi, 123 (finding the
public discovered leaks 23% of the time during the study while electronic leak detection
systems detected the leak only 17% of the time.).
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technology is evolving to meet the needs of leak detection, but
they have not yet been demonstrated as reliable.83
Detection is critical for obvious reasons. The earlier a leak is found, the
less damage caused to the environment and the operator’s business.
According to a Reuters review of PHMSA data, of the 361 pipeline
incidents that went undetected by internal systems since 2010, a total of
141,421 barrels of petroleum products spilled, totaling $1.2 billion in
property damages. 84
The bottom line is that domestic oil and gas pipeline ruptures are not
uncommon but are difficult to detect electronically or to prevent, extremely
damaging to the environment, and potentially deadly. While natural
corrosion or welding issues caused these aforementioned incidents, the
consequences would not materially differ if a rupture was caused by
cyberattacks.
B. Low Frequency Electronic Resistance Welding
In addition to the difficulties inherent in ensuring an operator is promptly
notified of a pipeline spill or breach (ideally by an electronic warning
system installed on the pipeline), inadequate construction standards for
pipelines built before 1970 have led many of the systems on those pipelines
to fail without warning.
Due to concerns regarding the large number of leaks in older pipelines,
the National Institute of Standards and Technology, a technology lab run by
the U.S. Commerce Department, studied the performance history of low
frequency electronic resistance welded pipe commonly used by pipeline
operators in construction prior to 1970. 85 The agency concluded that it was
“clear that ERW pipe manufactured before about 1970 is particularly
susceptible to failure.” This study documented 172 welding seam failures in
the pipelines carrying liquids over the previous 20 years.86
The research reported evidence that corrosion and metal fatigue caused
by pressure changes from flowing liquids could worsen the existing pipe’s
weld defects. 87 The defective welds were found to be directly related to the
low frequency electric resistance welding technology used during this
83. Id. at xvi.
84. See Renshaw, supra note 77.
85. See R.J. FIELDS ET AL., NAT’L INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF
COMM., AN ASSESSMENT OF THE PERFORMANCE AND RELIABILITY OF OLDER ERW PIPELINES
1 (1989), available at https://archive.org/details/assessmentofperf8941fiel.
86. Id. at 9-17.
87. See Id. at 3-4; see also Lee, supra note 68.
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period. 88 Over time, the welds in low frequency electric resistance welding
pipe were found to be susceptible to selective seam corrosion, hook cracks,
and inadequate bonding of the seams. 89
A manufacturing change occurred in 1970, when the low frequency
welding process was superseded by high frequency electric resistance
welding in pipeline construction. High frequency welds are higher quality,
which is statistically less likely to fail during normal operating conditions.90
Damage from ruptured crude oil transmission lines are more visible to
the public eye, but natural gas leaks can also cause serious safety issues and
property damage. In the past two decades, the government has recorded
“more than 2,000 accidents on natural gas transmission lines across the
U.S., resulting in 46 deaths, 181 injuries and $1.8 billion in property
damage.” 91
The previously mentioned explosion of a 54-year-old Pacific Gas &
Electric natural gas distribution pipeline in the densely populated San
Francisco suburb of San Bruno illustrates such danger. The explosion left
behind massive destruction, leaving a crater, igniting fierce fires, destroying
38 homes, killing 8 individuals, and injuring many more. 92 During the
investigation, federal investigators reported that they found numerous
defective welds in the pipeline.93
Many of these serious pipeline incidents have several elements in
common: old systems, welding methods no longer accepted as safe or
allowed in new pipeline construction, defective materials, and in many
cases signs of corrosion due to the age of the system. 94 To put the issue into
perspective, more than half of the nation’s pipelines are at least 40 years
old. 95 These systems were constructed before current regulatory standards,
technologically advanced corrosion protection systems and x-ray testing
88. Id. at 3-5.
89. Id. at 3.
90. See id. at 4-5; see also Dallas Morning News, “Welding Flaw Raises Pipeline Risk”
(September 15, 2013) page 2A.
91. See Explosive history prompts pipeline safety proposal to address gaps in oversight,
Associated Press (March 17, 2016), http://www.pennlive.com/nation-world/2016/03/
gas_pipeline_safety_proposal.html.
92. See Bell, supra note 23, at 14 (The explosion and fire was so intense local television
coverage thought an airplane had crashed into the subdivision.).
93. See Jason Dearen, Report on Calif Pipeline Blast Finds Weld Defects, Associated
Press (Jan. 21, 2011), http://archive.boston.com/business/articles/2011/01/21/report_on_
calif_pipeline_blast_finds_weld_defects/.
94. See Lee, supra note 68.
95. Id.
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were established. 96 Compared to modernly constructed pipelines, pipelines
constructed under these past unsound regulatory conditions are particularly
vulnerable to cyberattacks.
C. Preventative Testing For Leaks and Defects
Due to the number of pipeline incidents, and the aging pipeline
infrastructure, both industry and regulators have explored preventative
methods to identify and test for pipeline integrity and defects. The Battelle
Memorial Institute conducted a study of existing pipeline systems for
PHMSA, analyzing 280 cases in which electric-welded pipes failed
between 1950 and 2005. 97 The research group concluded that the most
efficient way to identify a weld defect was to remove the crude oil,
gasoline, or natural gas and pump water into the pipeline in a process called
“hydrostatic testing.” 98
This testing process raises the internal pipeline pressure above the
operating norm to check for leaks that may be apparent when additional
stresses are added to the system. 99 Such tests are costly and require a
company to shut down and drain the line of its contents. The Battelle study
found that such testing can actually weaken the electric welded seams due
to expansion and contraction, increasing the chance of failure when the
pipeline is placed back in service.100
In addition to hydrostatic testing, many pipelines are inspected using a
“smart pig” device. This device is inserted into a pipeline and transmits or
records data as it is pushed through the pipeline.101 Studies indicate these
devices have a reliability of around 90% in identifying potential problems.
Unfortunately, smart pigs tend to miss corrosion or tiny cracks that occur in
a pipe’s longitudinal welded seam, which is a common occurrence in older
low frequency welded pipe. 102

96. Id.
97. See BATTELLE MEM’L INST., FINAL SUMMARY REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
THE COMPREHENSIVE STUDY TO UNDERSTAND LONGITUDINAL ERW SEAM FAILURES (2013),
available
at
https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/matrix/FilGet.rdm?fil=8501&s=564166D08
D9B4BDC945E61DE0EF85D94&c=1.
98. Id. at A-12.
99. See Fact Sheet: Hydrostatic Pressure Testing, Pipeline & Hazardous Materials
Safety Admin., https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/FactSheets/FSHydrostaticTesting.htm.
100. See BATTELLE MEM’L INST., supra note 97, at 17-18.
101. See Fact Sheet: In-Line Inspections (Smart Pig), Pipeline & Hazardous Materials
Safety Admin., https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/FactSheets/FSSmartPig.htm.
102. See Lee, supra note 68; see also BATTELLE MEM’L INST., supra note 97, at 16.
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The unsteady state of the physical pipeline infrastructure in the U.S.
makes facilities extremely vulnerable to damage in the event of a
cyberattack. Simply altering operating pressures, flow direction, or flow
rates have led to pipeline spills and ruptures in older legacy pipelines,
resulting in massive spills. 103 If a cyberattack manages to alter the operating
parameters in a way that exceeds pipeline design limitations, high
probability exists that substantial damage will occur.
V. Federal Regulatory Structure
The federal regulatory structure currently in place addressing pipeline
cybersecurity issues is one of recent origin given the relatively recent nature
of the threat. The origin of federal programs addressing oil and gas pipeline
cybersecurity issues stems primarily from federal legislation promulgated to
address pipeline safety issues. 104
Under the statutes, the DOT was given primary authority to regulate key
aspects of interstate pipeline safety including design, construction,
operations, maintenance, and spill response. Pipeline regulation is overseen
by the DOT’s PHMSA. 105
Furthermore, as the U.S. economy modernized, in 1998, the Clinton
administration issued a presidential directive addressing the growing
concerns over the vulnerability of the nation’s infrastructure with regards to
both physical and cyberattacks. 106 Pursuant to the directive, the DOT holds
responsibility for pipeline security in addition to its safety
responsibilities. 107 Under this authority, working with the Department of
Energy, industry groups, and state pipeline safety organizations, the DOT
“promoted the development of consensus standards for security
measures.” 108
103. See Gilbert, supra note 61.
104. The Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-481, 82. Stat. 720
(codified as amended as 49 U.S.C. § 60101 et seq. (2016)) and the Hazardous Liquid
Pipeline Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-129 (codified as amended as 49 U.S.C. § 60101 et seq.
(2016)) are two of the principal early acts establishing the federal role in pipeline safety.
105. The DOT’s website contains information with regard to the various sectors they
regulate, including the PHMSA (available at https://www.transportation.gov/home).
106. See WHITE HOUSE, PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE-63: CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (1998), available at https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/
items/show/12762.
107. Id. at 10.
108. See Parfomak Testimony, supra note 26, at 4; see e.g., American Petroleum Inst.,
Nat’l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n., Security Vulnerability Assessment Methodology for
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After the events of September 11, 2001, the Transportation Security
Administration (“TSA”) was established with the passage of the Aviation
and Transportation Security Act. .109 The act vested in the TSA
responsibility for security in “all modes of transportation,” including
“security responsibilities over . . . modes of transportation that are exercised
by the Department of Transportation.” 110 Thus, the TSA interpreted the act
as granting the DOT’s pipeline security authority under the Clinton
presidential directive within the TSA. 111 However, with the TSA focusing
primarily on aviation regulation early on, the DOT maintained a prominent
regulatory role through circulating formal guidance developed in
cooperation with the pipeline industry associations, defining the DOT’s
recommendations and implementation expectations .112
On November 25, 2002, President Bush signed the Homeland Security
Act of 2002. 113 This Act created the Department of Homeland Security and
transferred the TSA and its pipeline security regulation authority from the
DOT to the Department of Homeland Security, where it remains today. 114
The existing regulatory structure will continue to evolve as cybersecurity
threats become a larger issue to both the economy and the public.
A. TSA Pipeline Regulation
Under the current statutory and regulatory system, the TSA is vested
with the authority to issue pipeline security and cybersecurity
regulations. 115 But the TSA has not issued specific regulations or
cybersecurity mandates out of a concern that mandatory standards may
encourage pipeline operators to adopt a lower standard of protection than
many industry participants have already voluntarily adopted.116
the Petroleum and Petrochemical Industries (2003), https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0502/
ML050260624.pdf.
109. President Bush signed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, 49 U.S.C. §
40101, in November 2001.
110. 49 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2) (2001).
111. PAUL W. PARFOMAK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31990, PIPELINE SECURITY: AN
OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL ACTIVITIES AND CURRENT POLICY ISSUES 14 (2004),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/RL31990.pdf
112. See Parfomak Testimony, supra note 26, at 4; see also TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN.,
PIPELINE SECURITY GUIDELINES 1 (2011), https://www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/tsapipeline
securityguidelines-2011.pdf.
113. 6 U.S.C. §§ 101-1533 (2002).
114. Id. at § 203 (The DOT retained pipeline safety and inspection responsibilities).
115. See PARFOMAK, supra note 21, at 1.
116. Id. at 7-8.
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Instead of issuing bright line regulations, the TSA has addressed
cybersecurity regulatory concerns through issuance of voluntary “best
practice” recommendations and guidance.117 Voluntary, as opposed to
mandatory, regulations have been controversial since most energy sector
regulatory requirements have historically been mandatory in nature. In
addition, some have questioned the limited amount of TSA resources
dedicated to the pipeline cybersecurity effort in light of the extent and
ubiquitous nature of the nation’s pipeline system. 118 For example, the
TSA’s pipeline security division as of 2012 only staffed 13 full-time
employees 119 and as of 2016 the pipeline security division staff would
“account for less than 2% of the agency’s surface transportation security
staff under the proposed FY2017 budget.” 120 Additional responsibilities
such as formal rulemaking and enforcement would not be possible at
current staffing and budgetary levels.121
Because the TSA has chosen to rely on voluntary guidance to regulate
the industry, the industry is essentially self-regulated. For example, the
Interstate Natural Gas Association of America maintains its own extensive
cybersecurity guidelines for natural gas pipeline control systems. Similarly
the American Petroleum Institute (“API”) maintains an industry standard
for oil pipeline control system security. 122
Essentially, the voluntary standards promulgated by industry insiders are
just as authoritative as those set forth by the TSA. As an example, to defend
systems against cyberattacks the API recommends that pipeline operators
follow “API standard 1164.” 123 This standard requires operators to keep
systems for pipeline operations separate from business systems. 124 API
Standard 1164 also requires pipeline operators to follow precautionary

117. Id. at 6.
118. See Parfomak Testimony, supra note 26, at 12-13.
119. See PARFOMAK, supra note 21, at 8.
120. See Parfomak Testimony, supra note 26, at 13.
121. PARFOMAK, supra note 21, at 9-10.
122. See American Petroleum Inst., supra note 108.
123. See Pipelines: Securing the Veins of the American Economy: Hearing Before the H.
Subcomm. on Transp. Sec., 114th Cong. 2 (2016) (statement of Andrew Black, President and
CEO, Ass’n of Oil Pipelines), http://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM07/20160419/104773/
HHRG-114-HM07-Wstate-BlackA-20160419.pdf.
124. Id.
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measures and implement preventative practices to ensure sound security
practices are in place.125
The pipeline industry generally supports voluntary standards and
recommendations. Many firms in the sector are concerned that regulators
will adopt mandatory standards. These mandatory standards could establish
a standard of care against which alleged negligence could be measured.
Industry associations have also been concerned that specific voluntary or
mandatory standards could expose the pipeline operator to liability in the
event of a cybersecurity breach. 126
B. 2014 Cybersecurity Framework
Recognizing the cybersecurity threat to all sectors of the domestic
economy, President Obama issued an executive order addressing this issue
in February 2013. 127 The order expanded public-private information sharing
and required the Commerce Department’s National Institute for Standards
and Technology (NIST) to prepare a voluntary “Cybersecurity
Framework”. 128
The Framework provides a voluntary procedure to identify cybersecurity
best practices utilized by industry, determine the overall state of an
organization's cyber risk management practices, and structure management
recommendations for organizations to mitigate those risks. 129
The Cybersecurity Framework attempts to set out consensus standards to
provide a flexible and cost-effective approach for companies to enhance
125. For a draft version of API Standard 1164 see Pipeline SCADA Security, American
Petroleum
Inst.,
http://ballots.api.org/pipeline/ballots/docs/Std1164_SCADASecurity_
ballotdraft_3Ed_20161028.pdf.
126. See Cyber Threats and Security Solutions: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on
Energy and Commerce, 113th Cong. 10 (2013) [hereinafter McCurdy Testimony] (statement
of Dave
McCurdy,
President
and
CEO,
American
Gas
Association),
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF00/20130521/100883/HHRG-113-IF00-WstateMcCurdyD-20130521.pdf.
127. Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, 3 C.F.R. § 13636 (2013), available
at
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2014-title3-vol1/pdf/CFR-2014-title3-vol1eo13636.pdf.
128. Id. at 217-219; see generally Why you should adopt the NIST Cybersecurity
Framework,
PwC
(May
2014),
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/increasing-iteffectiveness/publications/assets/adopt-the-nist.pdf.
129. See 3 C.F.R. § 13636.7; see generally Scott J. Shackelford et al., Toward a Global
Cybersecurity Standard of Care?:Exploring the Implications of the 2014 NIST Cybersecurity
Framework on Shaping Reasonable National and International Cybersecurity Practices, 50
Tex. Int’l L.J. 303 (2015), available at http://www.tilj.org/content/journal/50/14%20
SHACKELFORD%20PUB%20PROOF.pdf.
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cybersecurity. Owners and operators of critical infrastructure could in
theory use this program to assesses and manage cyber risk. 130
It is important to note that the Cybersecurity Framework is not
specifically focused on the energy sector or pipeline industry. As such, its
recommendations are more broadly applicable to sectors of the economy
that may not face the dangers inherent in transporting flammable, and many
times explosive, materials over long distances.131 Compliance with the
Framework recommendations remains voluntary.
VI. Tort Liability
In a case involving damages from a pipeline incident caused by a
cybersecurity breach, the plaintiff will have the burden of proving liability
as well as the obligation to quantify any damages incurred. 132 Due to the
complexity of the pipeline system, construction methods, operations, data
control systems, and cybersecurity, most cases will require expert
testimony. 133
The energy sector is heavily regulated at both the federal and state level
with numerous standards, orders, and enforcement actions. These
regulations have been used in many cases to establish a standard of conduct
expected of industry participants. ￼￼ 134 Violation of these regulations or
statutes can be pursued by both agencies as well as by private litigants
requesting damages, and it is not unusual for the courts to adopt the
regulation as a standard of care.135
Cybersecurity threats are evolving in nature and severity, and there is a
lack of mandated standards and regulations applicable to industry
participants. As a result, the liability of a pipeline operator for a breach of
security may not be as straightforward as the liability consideration when a
130. See Why you should adopt the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, supra note 128.
131. See Weiss v. Thomas & Thomas De. Co., 680 N.E.2d 1239, 1242 (Ohio 1997)
(setting a higher standard of care because natural gas is a “dangerous commodity” with “dire
consequences” when the flammable and explosive gas escapes containment) (quoting Suiter
v. Ohio Valley Co., 225 N.E.2d 792, 792 (Ohio 1967)).
132. See Corbello v. Iowa Prod., 850 So. 2d 686 (La. 2003) (finding the plaintiff had
established environmental liability and had quantified damages by a preponderance of the
evidence).
133. See infra note 259.
134. 16 Tex. Admin. Code, § 3.9 (2014) (regulating the disposal of produced water from
oil and gas wells and the permitting requirements for underground injection control wells).
135. Generally regulatory agencies can impose a fine for violations. Damages to injured
parties are awarded to claimants in state or federal court.
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pipeline ruptures due to corrosion or a construction defect. We expect that
some of the basic legal principles addressed in historical pipeline cases
might be extended to cases that deal with cybersecurity incidents.
For example, cases generally have held that natural gas utilities or
pipelines have been held to a higher standard of care than normal due to the
danger they present to the public. 136 Though damages from a pipeline
breach are generally linked to foreseeable harms, the issue is a question of
fact and damages are sometimes held unrecoverable, especially when
“extraordinary use” of the surface leads to injury. 137 Should a pipeline be at
risk of a rupture, the operator likely will have a duty to warn the public of
the danger. Voluntary industry standards can in some cases be utilized to
evaluate whether a pipeline has met its duty of care to the public. We will
analyze these issues in detail below.
A. Pipeline Operator’s Duty of Reasonable Care
The standard of care generally required of defendants in tort actions is
that of a “reasonably prudent” person. 138 The inquiry defines “what a
reasonable person would have done under similar circumstances,” which
will “necessarily depend on the particular facts of each case.” 139 A
particular industry custom or practice is probative of what conduct would
be considered reasonable under the circumstances.
Courts examining the issue of a pipeline operator’s duty of care have
held that an entity which transports or distributes natural gas is under a duty
to exercise a “higher degree” of care than normal due to the dangers
inherent in handling flammable, explosive, and toxic substance.140
The duty of reasonable care has been defined as requiring a company
distributing natural gas for domestic use to deliver such gas at a safe,
uniform pressure, to institute and maintain an efficient system of oversight
136. See Weiss, 680 N.E.2d at 1242 (“It is a matter of common knowledge that although
gas is a highly useful commodity it is also a dangerous commodity with a marked tendency
to escape from its proper confines.”); see also Nw. Ohio Natural Gas Co., v. First Cong.
Church of Toledo, 184 N.E. 512, 513 (Ohio 1933) (“By reason of the highly dangerous
character of gas and its tendency to escape, a gas company must use a degree of care, to
prevent the escape of gas from its pipes, commensurate with the danger.”).
137. See Phillips Pipeline Co. v . Razo, 420 S.W.2d 691, 693-695 (Tex. 1967).
138. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Midcap, 893 A.2d. 542, 554 (Del. 2004); see also
Robelen Piano Co. v. DiFonzo, 169 A.2d 240, 244, (Del. 1961).
139. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 893 A.2d at 554.
140. Margay Oil Corp. v. Jamison, 59 P.2d 790, 792 (Okla. 1936); Weiss, 680 N.E.2d at
1242; Schell v. OXY USA Inc., 822 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1136 (D. Kan. 2011).
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to ensure that the pressure continues to remain safe and uniform, and to
provide a “prompt remedy for accidents.” 141 Other cases have held that the
duty to produce and distribute gas in a reasonably safe and prudent manner
did require the distributors to warn consumers of dangerous leaks by
odorizing the gas they supply. 142
Because of the precarious character of crude oil and natural gas and the
multitude of dangers involved in distributing the fuel, most courts have
refrained from explicitly stating the specific degree of care required.143 The
policy has been that those handling flammable and explosive substances
should be required to exercise such a “degree of care” and caution as is
“commensurate” with the known danger.144 Whether or not defendant
exercised such care is an issue of fact, which should be submitted to a
jury. 145
Plaintiffs in such cases have argued that in addition to common law
rules, applicable regulations may establish a standard of care or benchmark
for the pipeline operator. 146 This is especially true for natural gas
distribution systems where the pressure, odorization, quality, and a host of
other factors are strictly regulated. “Reasonable care” in the distribution of
141. See Indiana Natural & Illuminating Gas Co. v. Long, 59 N.E. 410 (Ind. Ct. App.
1901) (holding a municipal water utility liable for tortious injury to private rights where the
utility failed to supply water to a greenhouse at the agreed upon pressure for a number of
days); see also City of Huntingburg v. Morgen 162 N.E. 255 (Ind. Ct. App. 1928) (en banc).
142. See Roberts v. Ind. Gas & Water Co., 218 N.E.2d 556 (Ind. Ct. App. 1966) (en
banc), on rehearing, 221 N.E.2d 693 (Ind. Ct. App. 1966) (en banc); Richmond Gas Co. v.
Baker, 45 N.E. 1049, 1050 (Ind. 1897) (holding a gas utility owed duty to all persons who
might be injured to use ordinary and adequate care in delivering substance to residence);
City of Indianapolis v. Walker, 168 N.E.2d 228 (Ind. Ct. App. 1961) (requiring a gas utility
to exercise ordinary care in maintenance of line); see also S. Ind. Gas Co. v. Tyner, 97 N.E.
580, 585 (Ind. Ct. App. 1911) (finding a gas company owed duty to customers, patrons, and
occupants of buildings where it supplied agency to use care commensurate with danger to
which it exposed persons or property.
143. S. Tex. Nat. Gas Gathering Co. v. Guerra, 469 S.W.2d 899, 909 (Tex. App. 1971)
(“In the absence of a standard of care established by statute or regulation, the courts have
said that a pipeline owner or operator is under a duty to exercise that degree of care which a
prudent man would exercise under all the circumstances, or care which is commensurate
with the dangerous character of the pipeline and necessary to protect the public from
foreseeable injury therefrom. An analysis of the cases shows that the duty and standard of
care that a pipeline operator owes to a person on the surface of a pipeline right of way varies
according to the status of the parties and the use of the property.”).
144. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co. v. Oklahoma R.R. Co., 188 P. 331, 332 (Okla. 1920).
145. Goodwin v. Enserch Corp., 949 F.2d 1098, 1107 (10th Cir. 1991).
146. Brozak v. Broad, No. 12 CVC-05-6865, 2013 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 10294, at * (Ohio
Ct. Of Common Pleas 2013).
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natural gas can be established by examining the applicable regulations since
the utility is transporting and delivering a dangerous instrumentality. 147
For example, in South Eastern Indiana Natural Gas Co. v. Ingram, the
plaintiffs allege that a utility that “supplied gas to them experienced a
partial interruption of service to its customers in the form of a reduction in
line pressure.” 148 While the utility’s employees responded to phone calls in
the early hours of the interruption, at no time did they attempt to notify the
plaintiff that she should switch to an emergency source of heat.149
Hours later, when the greenhouse temperature was zero degrees and the
contents of it were a total loss, the loss of heat caused by the reduction in
line pressure was discovered. 150 The plaintiff alleged that the utility’s
“negligence in not warning them to switch to an emergency source of heat
was the proximate cause of their damages, which included a loss of
inventory, profits, customers, labor, interest on borrowed money, and
additional damages.” 151
The court in South Eastern Indiana Natural Gas noted that the duty
owed—the obligation to conform to a certain standard of care—was a
question of law for the court.152 It determined that the gas supplier had a
duty to its customers. 153 The question of whether the natural gas utility met
that duty of reasonable care in proving natural gas services to customers
was a question of fact. 154
B. Duty and Foreseeability
The question of whether a duty arises to third parties also turns on the
question of whether the damage from a pipeline cyberattack is
foreseeable. 155 In Texas, the courts set out the general rule that “a party
should not be held responsible for the consequences of an act which ought

147. S. Ind. Gas Co. v. Tyner, 97 N.E. 580, 580 (Ind. Ct. App. 1911).
148. 617 N.E.2d. 943, 946 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993).
149. Id. at 946.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 951.
153. Id. (“[T]he duty of a utility to use reasonable care in the distribution of gas is
imposed by law for a second reason: the utility conveys a dangerous instrumentality.”).
154. Id. at 950.
155. See Isaacs v. Huntington Mem’l Hosp., 695 P.2d 653, 664 (Ca. 1985) (“It is well
settled that an owner of land has a duty ‘to take affirmative action to control the wrongful
acts of third persons which threaten invitees where the [owner] has reasonable cause to
anticipate such acts and the probability of injury resulting therefrom.’” (citation omitted)).
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not reasonably to have been foreseen.” 156 A party will not be negligent
whether it does or fails to do an act when the possible resulting injury is not
anticipated.157 Neither a legal nor a moral obligation exists to guard against
that which cannot be foreseen. 158
In Wohlford v. American Gas Production Co., a landowner sued an oil
and gas producer for damages to his land, grass, and cattle that resulted
from the “blowing” of a gas well. 159 As the court explained, gas wells must
be occasionally cleaned. 160 Here, the company operating the well was
attempting to remove accumulations of dirt, liquids, sand, rocks, water, and
shale in the wellbore, which had caused a serious decrease in the flow of
gas. 161 By venting the natural gas well into the atmosphere twice a year, the
operator removed these obstacles to production.162
This method of venting into the atmosphere was the “most efficient way
to clean gas wells” and was customarily used in the industry unless “salt
water, oil, or perhaps some other objectionable or poisonous substance”
was present. 163 The “more pressure and velocity,” the “more rubbish blown
out of the well” according to the court.164
Though the operator had used this method of cleaning the well for years
with no apparent damage to the surface or animals, in this case, arsenic was
within the mix of substances blown from the well; the discharge poisoned
the landowner's cattle. 165 As this was the “first known case of arsenic
damage from a gas well,” the operator had no knowledge of the arsenic, had
never encountered this problem in prior operations on the property, and
nearby wells had not experienced such an issue. 166
Applying Texas law, the court found the arsenic and the resulting cattle
deaths were not foreseeable, therefore a negligence claim was not

156. Texas & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bigham, 38 S.W. 162, 163 (Tex. 1896).
157. Id. at 163.
158. Id.
159. 218 F.2d 213, 214 (5th Cir. 1955).
160. Id. at 216.
161. Id. (“The gas passing through the earth's formations carries with it dirt, liquids,
shale, rocks, oil and water which settle around the wells and materially reduce the flow of
gas. The general practice is to open the top of the pipe and 'let her blow'. More pressure and
velocity are thereby obtained and more rubbish blown out of the well.”).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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actionable. 167 In the court’s holding, it found that when the presence of
arsenic in the well admittedly could not have been foreseen, no duty rested
on the appellee to protect the appellant from the unknown and unheard of
hazard of arsenic in the well. 168
No duty arises when “unusual, improbable, extraordinary and freakish”
events result in an accident according to the courts, but the question of
foreseeability is determined on a case-by-case factual basis. 169
In Phillips Pipe Line Co. v. Razo, the court held that the use of heavy
equipment on a small, rarely used, private road or trail in muddy terrain was
an extraordinary use of the surface. 170 Here, when a bulldozer struck a
buried pipeline that exploded and subsequently caught fire, the court held
that such extraordinary use and injury was not foreseeable.171 Similar to the
Wohlford case, the Phillips court held the defendant was not liable for
damages since the pipeline operator's duty of ordinary care did not extend
to “hold the pipeline operator liable for every conceivable contact with the
pipeline.” 172
In examining the issue of foreseeability courts have noted that “it is
necessary to review the ‘totality of the circumstances’ including the nature,
condition and location of the defendant's premises.” 173 Foreseeability
involves the jury examining the “general character of the event or harm . . .
not its precise nature or manner of occurrence.” 174
In South Texas Natural Gas Gathering Co. v. Guerra, an employee of a
cattle company was injured when a bulldozer operator struck a natural gas
pipeline while constructing agricultural ponds on a ranch. 175 Applying
Texas law, the court noted

167. Id. at 217.
168. Id. (citing Carey v. Pure Distributing Corp., 124 S.W.2d 847, 849 (holding it is
required “the injury be of such a general character as might reasonably have been
anticipated.”)); see also San Antonio & A.P. R.R. Co. v. Behne, 231 S.W. 354, 356 (Tex.
Comm’n App. 1921, judgm’t adopted).
169. Larco Drilling & Exploration Corp. v. Brown, 267 So. 2d 308, 310 (Miss. 1972);
Ann M. v. Pac, Plaza Shopping Center, 863 P.2d 207 (Ca. 1993) (where the court noted that
a duty “will be imposed only where conduct can be reasonable anticipated”).
170. 420 S.W.2d 691 (Tex. 1967).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 695.
173. 420 S.W.2d 691.
174. Isaacs v. Huntington Mem’l Hosp., 695 P.2d 653, 661 (Ca. 1985) (quoting Bigbee v.
Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 665 P.2d 947 (Ca. 1983)).
175. 469 S.W.2d 899 (Tex. App. 1971).
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In the absence of a standard of care established by statute or
regulation, the courts have said that a pipeline owner or operator
is under a duty to exercise that degree of care which a prudent
man would exercise under all the circumstances, or care which is
commensurate with the dangerous character of the pipeline and
necessary to protect the public from foreseeable injury
therefrom. An analysis of the cases shows that the duty and
standard of care that a pipeline operator owes to a person on the
surface of a pipeline right of way varies according to the status
of the parties and the use of the property. 176
The South Texas court concluded that at the time of the accident, the
question of whether the use of the surface was “extraordinary” was an issue
for the jury to decide. 177 If the surface use was determined to be
extraordinary the pipeline operator might not anticipate such use, and the
duty to mark the route of the pipeline might not exist.178
In Prudential Fire Insurance Co. v. United Gas Corp., the defendant gas
company installed a meter to a gas line on the plaintiff’s property. The facts
were disputed as to whether the defendant installed the meter with defects
or whether the plaintiff damaged the meter causing a gas leak which
subsequently caused an explosion destroying the plaintiff’s property. 179
The plaintiff alleged that even if they had damaged the meter, the gas
company did not ensure there was a safeguard in place for the plaintiff’s
line to protect it from the actions of third parties.180 The plaintiff argued that
the gas company knew or should have known in placing the meter where it
was on the line it would be exposed to the public activity. 181
The court held that, even in light of the facts most favorable to the gas
company, the cause was reasonably foreseeable on the basis that the gas
company failed to provide adequate safeguards, considering the volatility of
the commodity that they were providing and given that they had actual
knowledge that the meter was unprotected and exposed to third party
damage. 182

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. at 909 (citing the annotation at 30 ALR 3rd 670).
Id. at 910.
Id.; See also Phillips Pipe Line Co. v. Razo, 420 S.W.2d 691 (Tex. 1967).
199 S.W. 2d 767, 768 (Tex. 1946).
Id. at 769.
Id.
Id. at 773.
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Where damages might be extensive, or where a dangerous situation
could result in substantial loss to the public, the courts have further
considered policy considerations when examining the question of
foreseeability. 183
In Lammle v. Gappa Oil Co., after an uncapped propane line caused an
explosion that leveled the plaintiff’s home and caused the plaintiff to
sustain severe injuries, she filed suit against numerous parties involved in
the renovation project including the furnace manufacturer and the
wholesale suppliers of propane gas. 184
The court in Lammle held that “while propane gas is a dangerous product
and explosions are conceivable, public policy does not support imposing a
duty on wholesale suppliers with respect to every conceivable explosion
that could occur at any point in the supply chain.” 185 Continuing, the court
noted, “the fact that a certain event, such as a propane gas explosion, is
conceivable does not mean it is foreseeable in the legal sense.”186
A number of cases have determined that foreseeability does not require
that similar events had occurred in the past.187 Even with an absence of
prior similar events occurring an event could be foreseeable, and hence a
duty to protect would be created.188 The concept of foreseeability is
“elastic” according to some courts. 189 Where the extent of harm is elevated
the courts note they will be more likely to determine the damage was
foreseeable. 190

183. See Foss v. Kincade, 746 N.W.2d 912, 915-16 (Minn. App. 2008) where the court
held “a duty will not lie when the connection between the damage-causing event and the
alleged negligent act is ‘too remote to impose liability as a matter of public policy,’”
(quoting Germann v. F.L. Smithe Mach. Co., 395 N.W.2d 922, 924 (Minn. 1986)).
184. Lammle v. Gappa Oil Co., A08-0582, 2009 Min. App. LEXIS 42, at *2 (Min. Ct.
App. Jan. 13, 2009).
185. Id. at *11.
186. Id. at *10 (quoting Foss).
187. See Isaacs .v Huntington Mem’l Hosp., 695 P.2d 653, 659 (Cal. 1985) which noted
“the fortuitous absence of prior injury does not justify relieving defendant from
responsibility for the foreseeable consequences of its acts,” (quoting Weirum v. RKO Gen.,
Inc., 539 P.2d 36 (Ca. 1975)).
188. See Isaacs, 695 P.2d at 659; Ann M., 863 P.2d at 214.
189. Lopez v. McDonald's Corp., No. D004619, 1987 Cal. App. LEXIS 1913, at *510
(4th Dist. July 9, 1987).
190. Isaacs, 695 P.2d at 659.
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C. Foreseeabiility and Cyberintrusion
Industry surveys indicate that many energy sector executives believe the
chance of a cybersecurity breach of U.S. infrastructure is a relatively likely
occurrence over the next several years, with the potential for loss of life.191
But, to date, no domestic pipelines have been subject to a cyberattack
causing a leak or damages. 192
Where an event causing damage is ‘extraordinary’, ‘improbable’ or
‘freakish’ in nature the courts have been reluctant to find they were
foreseeable, and therefore have held that there was not a duty to protect. 193
The courts have noted that foreseeability is a question of fact, which
depends on the specific circumstances.194
With the lack of mandatory cybersecurity standards issued by the
TSA, 195 many pipeline operators who comply with voluntary industry
standards, TSA recommendations, and guidelines could attempt to argue
they did not expect—in the normal course of business—to encounter a
cybersecurity breach. According to this industry argument, the occurrence
of a damage-causing cyber intrusion would be highly unusual and
unexpected. It would follow that since the event was not foreseeable, no
duty would exist on the part of the pipeline operator to protect the public or
third parties. 196
Offsetting this argument is the fact that many jurisdictions addressing the
foreseeability question have adopted the view that a prior event similar to
the incident causing harm is not required to establish foreseeability. 197
Under this line of reasoning, the fact no cybersecurity intrusions have
occurred on pipeline systems to date would not be a strong argument that
the event would not be foreseeable. Further, because the courts have
indicated that the concept of foreseeability is somewhat flexible, when the
potential harm to the public is elevated (as it would be in situations where
pipelines containing flammable and explosive substances are compromised)
the event is more likely to be determined to be foreseeable.198

191. Krancer et al., supra note 2.
192. See Parfomak Testimony, supra note 26, at 3.
193. Larco, 267 So. 2d 308, 310 (Miss. 1972); Ann M., 863 P.2d at 207.
194. Isaacs, 695 P.2d at 659.
195. See Parfomak Testimony, supra note 26, at 10.
196. See Isaacs, 695 P.2d at 659; see also Lopez v. McDonald's Corp., No. D004619,
1987 Cal. App. LEXIS 1913, at *512 (4th Dist. July 9, 1987).
197. Isaacs, 695 P.2d at 659.
198. Id.
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It is important to keep in mind that, in addition to the numerous pipeline
cybersecurity incidents that have already occurred in other areas of the
world, the number and sophistication of cyberattacks in general have been
increasing domestically, furthering the notion that such an act would be
considered foreseeable. 199
Regarding foreseeability, it is likely that—in most factual scenarios—a
court could determine a pipeline cyber intrusion would be expected to occur
based on the trends discussed previously. In light of such a finding, the
pipeline would have a foreseeable duty to protect third parties and the
public from damage.
D. Duty to Warn of Danger
If a pipeline system has been compromised by a cyberattack, does the
operator have a duty to warn customers or the public about the potential
harm that might be caused by such an intrusion?
In American Cyanamid Co. v. Sparto, 200 a Texas court addressed the
question of whether a petroleum refinery located just north of Fort Worth
had a duty to warn downstream parties that the plant had dumped high
volumes of salts into the Trinity River as part of the refining process.201
The use of the high saline downstream water for irrigation was
deleterious to the landowner’s crops, stunted crop growth, and created a
permanent salt crust on the soil. 202 The court held that since the refinery
created the environmental hazard at issue it had a duty to warn the
downstream farmers about the danger of utilizing the polluted waters.203
In the case of Ford Motor Co. v. Dallas Power & Light Co., the court
addressed the issue of whether a party who controlled the floodgates to a
dam or cooling pond for an electrical generation station had a duty to warn
those downstream about an impending flood after a major storm. 204 The
court noted, “Texas law does recognize a duty to warn on the part of the

199. See Parfomak Testimony, supra note 26, at 2-3.
200. 267 F.2d 425 (5th Cir. 1959).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 427 (noting that the polluted process water contained several chemical
compounds that were primarily ammonium and sodium sulphate).
203. Id. at 429. (“[T]he appellant's right was not an unlimited one, it follows that if the
exercising of that right created a risk of injury to the appellees which might have been
averted by a warning, there was a duty to warn and the failure so to do would constitute
actionable negligence.”).
204. 499 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1974).
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person who creates a dangerous situation, although without negligence on
his part.” 205
In Buchanan v. Rose, the court stated, “We think it may also be said that
if one by his own acts, although without negligence on his part, creates a
dangerous situation . . . the one creating the same must give warning of the
danger or be responsible for the consequences.” 206
Because the defendant in Buchanan did not create the dangerous
situation and was “merely aware of the danger” when he failed to warn
fellow drivers, the Supreme Court of Texas did not find him liable.207 Mere
knowledge of a “dangerous situation or helpless condition of another
person” creates only a moral—not legal—duty to warn or render aid. 208
The Buchanan court lists as an example that one who, “without
negligence, strikes a trolley pole with his automobile and causes it to fall
across the road is liable for failure to protect others from injury thereby.” 209
Clarifying, the court noted that “the defendant by his own act created the
dangerous situation[]” and therefore had a duty to warn. 210
In the case where a third party cyber intrusion occurs, even without
pipeline operator negligence, a strong argument could be made that, since
the pipeline system in the hands of a cyberattacker presents a danger to the
public, a warning must be issued by the pipeline system operator. Failure to
issue such a warning could be considered negligence.
E. Negligence Per Se
A number of theories can be asserted by a party damaged by a
cybersecurity breach, although an allegation of negligence will likely be the
most common. A plaintiff who seeks to utilize a negligence cause of action
must prove (a) the existence of a legal duty, (b) violation of that duty, (c)
damages, (d) and proximate causation which results in the injury. 211
Generally, the cases dealing with pipelines have held that ruptures or
breaches tend to be foreseeable, and since the pipeline is transporting a

205. Id. at 412.
206. 159 S.W. 2d 109, 110 (Tex. 1942).
207. Id.
208. Ford, 499 F.2d at 412; Boyer v. Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe R.R., 306 S.W.2d 215,
222 (Tex. App. 1957).
209. Buchanan, 159 S.W. 2d at 110.
210. Id.
211. USAA Cas. Ins. Co. v. PM Terminals, Inc., No. 3:12cv868, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
139942, at *8 (E.D. Va. Aug. 6, 2013) (quoting Kellermann v. McDonough, 684 S.E.2d 786,
790 (Va. 2009)).
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hazardous, flammable, and in many cases explosive material, such cases
have held the pipeline operator to a higher standard of care.212
To establish a breach of this duty, the plaintiff can use a violation of a
rule, ordinance, or statute under a theory of negligence per se. The tort
concept of negligence per se is expressed in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts as “the unexcused violation of a legislative enactment or an
administrative regulation which is adopted by the court as defining the
standard of conduct of a reasonable man, is negligence in itself.”213
The theory of negligence per se is subject to some limitations, but can
make a plaintiff’s case easier to prove assuming the court adopts the
regulations or statutes as an appropriate method to establish a reasonable
standard of conduct.
In Rodriguez v. American Cyanamid Co., the court noted that a
“statutory violation is negligence per se if the court allows the statute to
stand in for the reasonable standard of conduct. The infraction then
constitutes a deviation from the standard of care, and the plaintiff need not
prove the existence of a duty and a breach.” 214
Numerous early energy cases applying the negligence per se theory were
brought in Oklahoma after the enactment of a statute that addressed the
standard of care required for “produced water,” the largest waste product
generated from most oil and gas wells.215 The statute—enacted in 1910,
shortly after Oklahoma become a state—provided that wastes should be
transported from the well premises and “in no case” should the waste or
saltwater be allowed to “flow over the land.” 216
In their review of this statute and the duty of care it imposed on an oil
and gas operators, Oklahoma Courts have noted that “[t]he statute is a penal
statute….[a] violation of the statute constitutes negligence and a violation

212. Weiss v. Thomas & Thomas De. Co., 680 N.E.2d 1239, 1239 (Ohio 1997).
213. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288B (1965).
214. 858 F.Supp. 127, 129 (D. Ariz 1994) (citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts §
286 (1965) that a “court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the
requirements of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation whose purpose is
found to be exclusively or in part: (a) to protect the particular class of persons which
includes the one whose interest is invaded, (b) to protect the particular interest which is
invaded, and (c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has resulted, and (d)
to protect that interest against the particular hazard from which the harm results.”).
215. Regulatory Determination for Oil and Gas and Geothermal Exploration,
Development and Production Wastes, 53 Fed. Reg. 25447 (July 6, 1988).
216. 52 Okla. Stat. §296 (2016).
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resulting in an injury to another constitutes actionable negligence”. 217
Subsequent cases have found that oil and gas well operators that allow salt
water wastes from oil or gas wells to run over the surface of the land are
liable to surface owners if they suffer injury. 218
Some courts have further noted that if statutes or regulations are used to
establish a duty of care, those statutes and regulations will be strictly
construed. 219 For example, the Oklahoma statute above applies to waste
from a producing oil or gas wells, and when a plaintiff attempted to use it to
establish a standard of care for pollution from a refinery or a pipeline, the
court held that the statute was inapplicable. 220 In addition to their strict
construction, statutes and regulations have been held as prospective in
nature and cannot be utilized retroactively to establish a duty of care. 221
In Sinclair Prairie Oil Co. v. Stell, a man drove his truck off a bridge and
drowned in a pool of salt water, which had been deposited in violation of
the oil and gas waste pollution statute. 222 In the subsequent lawsuit for
wrongful death, the court noted that the applicable statute was strictly
construed, with the intent of the statute to address environmental issues
from oil and gas wells, and so dismissed the claim of negligence per se. 223
The negligence per se doctrine is also limited by other exceptions. For
example, in the Texas case, Murfee v. Phillips Petroleum Co., the court
noted that the applicable Texas Railroad Commission regulation stated
“pollution was prohibited” was too general in nature to establish a standard
of conduct the violation would create negligence per se. 224
The Murfee case also noted that, in this instance, a thick limestone
barrier, which impeded the intrusion of polluted fluids, effectively protected
the area where groundwater allegedly was polluted by oil and gas

217. Wilcox Oil Co. v. Walters, 284 P.2d 726, 729 (Okla. 1955) (citing Tex. Co. v.
Belvin, 251 P.2d 804 (Okla. 1952)).
218. Sun Oil Co. v. Hoke, 169 P.2d 753 (Okla. 1946); Wilcox Oil Co. v. Walters, 284
P.2d 726 (Okla. 1955); Cleary Petroleum, Inc. v. Copenhaver, 476 P.2d 327 (Okla. 1970).
219. Wilcox Oil Co., 284 P.2d at 729.
220. See Johnson Oil & Refining Co. v. Carnes, 51 P.2d 811, 812 (Okla. 1935); see also
Gulf Pipe Line Co. v. Alred, 77 P.2d 1155 (Okla. 1938) (applying the rule from Johnson).
221. Hicks v. Humble Oil and Refining Co., 970 S.W.2d 90, 94 (Tex. App. 1998).
222. 124 P.2d 255, 257-58 (Okla. 1942).
223. Id. at 258.
224. 492 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. App. 1973). Strictly construed, this regulation would also
effectively create strict liability in Texas for pollution or spills, something the Texas
Supreme Court expressly rejected in Turner v. Big Lake Oil Company, 96 S.W.2d 221 (Tex.
1936).
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activity. 225 Because of this observation, the Murfee case can be said to
further stand for the fact that—even if a statute or regulation applies—the
court may grant an exception to liability on the negligence per se theory
when the facts support such a cite. 226
In Schwartzman, Inc. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., the
plaintiff filed suit under a number of environmental statutes asking for
monetary damages. 227 The court noted in that case the “[a]ssertion of a
negligence cause of action predicated on an alleged violation of a statute is
little more than an attempt to assert a private cause of action for damages by
privately enforcing the statute in question,” holding that the intent of the
legislation was to protect the public from environmental harm and not to
provide a private cause of action for damages. 228
Since cybersecurity regulations generally are voluntary in nature,229 it
follows that there is not a set of specific mandates available for a court to
examine and adopt as a reasonable standard of care. Due to the voluntary
scope of the cybersecurity regulations, and the lack of specific statutory or
regulatory mandates, the question arises if voluntary standards can serve to
establish a standard of care the violation of which would constitute
negligence per se.
F. Voluntary Versus Mandatory Standards
One of the key aspects of the pipeline cybersecurity regulations, is that
they are deemed voluntary by nature, and have therefore allowed flexibility
in decision making. Many of the industry players and associations, as well
as regulators, prefer this voluntary environment because it allows them to
be flexible in meeting their duty to the public, their employees, and
shareholders. 230
Regulators, for the most part also prefer voluntary standards since they
claim it allows them to adjust to rapidly changing cyber and technological
threats and developments. 231 The evolving nature of cyberattacks creates an
225. Murfee, 494 S.W.2d at 673-74.
226. Id.
227. 857 F. Supp. 838 (D.N.M. 1994).
228. Id. at 848 (noting the overriding criterion is legislative intent). But see Hicks v.
Humble Oil and Refining Co., 970 S.W.2d 90 (Tex. App. 1998) (noting the court need to
analyze the intent of the regulators in adopting certain oil and gas rules to determine if the
plaintiff could use those regulations to establish a duty of care).
229. See Parfomak Testimony, supra note 26, at 9.
230. See McCurdy Testimony, supra note 126, at 5-7.
231. Id. at 6. (McCurdy’s testimony also explains that the TSA Pipeline Security
Division has not issued mandatory cybersecurity regulations for the pipeline industry due in
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environment which makes it difficult to timely propose firm rules and
standards, much less adopt such rules after the delays inherent in the rule
making notice, comment, and hearing process.
Due to the relatively new nature of the cybersecurity threat there are few
cases specifically addressing the use of voluntary cybersecurity standards as
establishing a standard of care, but courts have reviewed voluntary
standards or industry customs in other cases. These decisions have
generally concluded that the voluntary standards do not automatically
establish a specific standard of care in a negligence case.232 Rather, the
breach of a voluntary standard constitutes “one more piece of evidence
upon which the jury could decide whether the defendant acted as a
reasonably prudent person in the circumstances of the case.”233
A defendant would be “free to argue that the [voluntary] standard is
unduly demanding, either in general or in the particular instance, and that
the standard does not reflect actual industry practice, [ ] that the standards
are not of a type that a reasonably prudent person would employ,” 234 or that
a violation of that standard is excused by the factual circumstance of the
particular case.235
In addition, it has been recognized that industry organizations or
regulators who possess differing degrees of expertise—especially in
technology-driven areas like cyber security—are the parties who develop
the voluntary standards. In some cases, industry participants have
conflicting interests; hence the voluntary rules may not reflect a consensus
viewpoint as to what should be considered reasonable or effective.
Voluntary standards may be considered “simply recommendations
written by experts” who may not themselves be available for crossexamination,” according to one court.236 The merits of the voluntary
standards are “for the jury's consideration like any other evidence in the
case.” 237

part to the effective partnership they have with industry and the fact the voluntary program
appears to be effective in addressing current threats.).
232. Getty Petroleum Mktg., Inc. v. Capital Terminal Co., 391 F.3d 312, 326 (1st Cir.
2004) (Lipez, J., concurring).
233. Id. at 326 (quoting Boston & Me. R.R. v. Talbert, 360 F.2d 286, 290 (1st Cir.
1966)).
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. (citing Boston & Me. R.R. v. Talbert, 360 F.2d 286, 290 (1st Cir. 1966)).
237. Id. at 326-27.
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Plaintiffs have also utilized specific company policies, as they have
utilized voluntary industry or regulator standards, in an attempt to establish
an applicable standard of care.238 Courts have noted that company policies
“represent some evidence of a reasonably prudent standard of care”239 but
have also recognized that “voluntary written policies and procedures do not
themselves establish a per se standard of due care.” 240 Similarly, violations
of safety policy or codes are evidence of negligence, but do not
conclusively establish negligence nor do they establish a negligence per se
standard of conduct. 241
Many cases follow the reasoning in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Midcap, in
which a propane kitchen range exploded destroying a home and killed one
of the occupants. 242 The plaintiff requested to enter into evidence an
industry wide safety program, which outlined the installation and
maintenance of propane equipment, the violation of which they claimed
would establish negligence. 243 The plaintiffs argued the program
established a reasonable standard of conduct for parties involved in
servicing this industry. 244
The voluntary program in Sears, Roebuck & Co. involved the limited
inspection of residential gas systems and the connected appliances.245 At
the time of the trial, no state or federal agency had made the standards
mandatory and the standards did not specifically recommend specific
details under what conditions the inspection should be completed.246 The
question of if additional periodic inspections should be conducted was not
addressed. 247 Additionally, the court noted that different industry
238. Brown v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City R.R. Co., 650 F.2d 159 at 163 (8th Cir. 1980)
(“The trend also favors admission of industry or voluntary association codes and of private
codes adopted by an employer.” (emphasis added)).
239. Hall v. Toreros, II, Inc., 626 S.E. 2d 861, 866 (N.C. App. 2006) (quoting Klassette
v. Mecklenburg County Area Mental Health, 364 S.E.2d 179, 183 (NC Court of Appeals
1988))
240. Id. at 183.
241. See Norris v. Zambito, 520 S.E.2d 113, 118 (N.C. App. 1999) (“A violation of
voluntarily adopted safety policies is merely some evidence of negligence and does not
conclusively establish negligence.”); see also Wilson v. Lowe’s Asheboro Hardware, Inc.,
131 S.E.2d 501, 505 (1963) (voluntary adoption of safety code “some evidence that a
reasonably prudent person would adhere to the requirements of the code.”).
242. 893 A.2d 542, 545 (Del. 2004).
243. Id.
244. Id. at 554.
245. Id. at 555.
246. Id.
247. Id.
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participants had implemented the standard in differing ways. 248 For these
reasons the court did not adopt the voluntary standard as establishing a
standard of care since there was no evidence that the program had been
adopted as a standard by the gas supply industry. 249
In Linden v. CNH America,, the question arose as to whether the
violation of an industry adopted safety code established negligence.250 The
court held that the jury could take the non-conformance with code into
consideration in the deliberations, but the non-conformance was not in itself
an indication the defendant had violated a standard of care.251 Generally,
courts have treated safety standards as “factual evidence that the court may
admit or exclude based on ordinary evidentiary principles.” 252
In Brown v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Railway Co., a railroad employee
acting as a lookout, was injured when he was struck by a switching stand
that was constructed too close to the tracks. 253 At trial the jury considered a
proposed regulation, which was not in effect at the time of the accident, as
evidence of negligence.254 On review the court noted recent trends in
standards:
The trend in federal as well as state court is to allow admission
of advisory safety codes promulgated by governmental authority
as showing an acceptable standard of care….The trend also
favors admission of industry or voluntary association codes and
of private codes adopted by an employer . . . . Such codes do not
have the force of law and do not establish negligence per se. 255
In Michaels v. Mr. Heater, Inc., a question arose with regard to expert
testimony alleging that the defendant’s failure to comply with a voluntary

248. Id.
249. Id.
250. 673 F.3d 829 (8th Cir. 2012).
251. Id. at 838.
252. See Getty Petroleum Mktg., Inc. v. Capital Terminal Co., 391 F.3d 312 (1st Cir.
2004) (citing Miller v. Yazoo Mfg. Co., 26 F.3d 81, 83-84 (8th Cir.1994) (where voluntary
standard was properly admitted)); See also Matthews v. Ashland Chem., Inc., 770 F.2d
1303, 1310–11 (5th Cir.1985) (where voluntary standards were properly excluded); Boston
& Me. R.R. v. Talbert, 360 F.2d 286, 290 (1st Cir.1966) (where voluntary standards were
properly admitted); Dickie v. Shockman, No. A3–98–137, 2000 WL 33339623, *3 (D.N.D.
July 17, 2000) (admitting expert testimony regarding voluntary standards)).
253. 650 F.2d 159, 163 (8th Cir. 1981).
254. Id.
255. Brown, 650 F.2d at 163 (citations omitted).
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industry standard was negligence. 256 In that case, a propane heater exploded
in a vehicle, resulting in critical injury to the driver.257 The plaintiffs alleged
that the product was defectively designed. 258 With regard to the expert
testimony the court referred to and relied upon the Federal Rules of
Evidence to determine if the expert testimony would assist the trier of fact
in making a decision. 259
The Michaels court determined that the expert testimony was admissible
since it assisted the court in understanding the alleged defect in the propane
fueled heating equipment.260 The court further noted the voluntary industry
standards were admissible and could be considered in light of the specific
facts, although they were not conclusive evidence of negligence.261
VII. Conclusion
The pipeline infrastructure in the United States is dated and vulnerable to
malicious cyberattacks. As illustrated by cyberattacks on pipelines outside
of the United States, these incidents could cause substantial damage and,
according to experts, the frequency with which our domestic pipeline
systems have been targeted for cyberattacks is only increasing. Many
predict it is only a matter of time until a major cyber event involving our
energy infrastructure occurs in the U.S.
It is difficult to establish a regulatory framework to insure that the energy
infrastructure is protected from cyberattacks due to the developing and
evolving nature of the threat. If specific mandates were adopted by the
regulatory agencies, such regulations likely would be too inflexible to
property address the cyber threat, and such mandates might even hinder an
operator’s response or leave them exposed to malicious activity.
256. 411 F. Supp 2d 992 (W.D. Wis. 2006).
257. Id. at 995.
258. Id.
259. FED. R. EVID. 702 states “If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient
facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the
witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.”
260. Michaels, 411 F. Supp 2d at 996-97.
261. Id. (citing Getty Petroleum Marketing, Inc. v. Capital Terminal Co., 391 F.3d 312,
326 (1st Cir. 2004) (Although “voluntary standards do not irrefutably establish the standard
of care in a negligence case . . . they constitute one more piece of evidence upon which the
jury could decide whether the defendant acted as a reasonably prudent person in the
circumstances of the case.”)).
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Voluntary cybersecurity standards similar to those currently in place are
probably best suited to the environment, especially where these standards
are adopted with joint industry and regulator participation while being
reviewed and regularly updated.
Ultimately, should a cyberattack occur and a pipeline system is breached
causing third party damage, general principles adopted by the courts in
historical tort cases involving pipelines will most likely apply. For instance,
the operator of a hydrocarbon pipeline most likely will be held to a higher
standard of care with regard to the cybersecurity issues due to its duty to
protect the public and environment from the explosive, toxic, and
flammable nature of the substances being transported.
Even if the attack is deemed terrorism, damage caused from a
cybersecurity attack involving a pipeline or SCADA system will most
likely be deemed foreseeable due to the number of global incidents that
have occurred over the last decade. Existing case law indicates that the
pipeline operator will have a duty to warn the public of the dangers
presented should a cyberattack occur. Therefore, voluntary standards most
likely will be admitted by the courts to allow an expert witness to establish
a negligence cause of action, though the court may not necessarily adopt
these voluntary standards to define a standard of care for the operator in a
negligence per se claim.
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